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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS	
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4	HIGHSTEPPIN' PRODUCTIONS, LLC,)	
5	Plaintiff,)	
6) vs.) CA No. 09-12208-NMG	
7)	
8	GEORGE PORTER, JR., et al,) Defendants.)	
9		
10	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE NATHANIEL M. GORTON	
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12	HEARING ON MOTIONS	
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15	John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse Courtroom No. 4	
16	One Courthouse Way Boston, MA 02210	
17	Tuesday, April 20, 2010 11:17 a.m.	
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20	Cheryl Dahlstrom, RMR, CRR	
21	Official Court Reporter John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse	
22	One Courthouse Way, Room 3209 Boston, MA 02210	
23	Mechanical Steno - Transcript by Computer	
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1 PROCEEDINGS THE CLERK: This is Civil Action 09-12208, 2 3 Highsteppin' Productions vs. Porter, et al. Will counsel please identify themselves. 4 5 MR. PENTON: Ronnie Penton on behalf of the PBS 6 defendants. My daughter, the young lawyer in the room, Mary 7 Ellen Penton, assisting me, Judge. THE COURT: Mr. Penton, Miss Penton. 8 MR. PIEKSEN: Good morning, Judge Gorton. John 9 11:17 10 Pieksen on behalf of George Porter, Jr. 11 THE COURT: Mr. Penton, you don't represent Mr. 12 Porter? 13 MR. PENTON: I represent Mr. Batiste, Mr. Stoltz and 14 PBS, Judge. 15 THE COURT: But not Mr. Porter? 16 MR. PENTON: That's correct. MR. BAKER: Judge, good morning. My name is Jeffrey 17 I'm here on behalf of the plaintiff, Highsteppin' 18 Baker. 19 Productions. To my immediate right is Attorney David Herlihy. 11:18 20 THE COURT: Mr. Herlihy, you represent the plaintiffs 21 as well? 22 MR. HERLIHY: I'm in-house counsel. 23 THE COURT: Do you have an appearance in on this case? 24 MR. HERLIHY: No, I do not. 25 THE COURT: I would like you to put an appearance in

before you leave today, Mr. Herlihy. Thank you. You may be seated, counsel.

MR. GOLD: Your Honor, Eric Gold, from Greenberg Traurig, on behalf of the reach-and-apply defendant, Live Nation.

THE COURT: Mr. Gold.

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MR. GOLD: Your Honor, if I can skip ahead a little bit, we had filed a motion to dismiss, and plaintiff's counsel let us know today that they will be assenting to that motion. So that I think that my appearance is no longer required.

THE COURT: All right. Is that true, Mr. Baker? You assent to the dismissal of Live Nation as a reach-and-apply defendant?

MR. BAKER: That is correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Then you can be excused, Mr. Gold. I will allow that motion, it being assented to.

MR. GOLD: Thank you very much, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Counsel, we have multiple motions at issue here. And what I'm going to do is to announce to you my strong inclinations, having considered the rather lengthy -- in fact, over-lengthy briefs in the case of the motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and/or for transfer of venue and with respect to -- one of the issues now, of course, has just gone away, and that is, to dismiss the reach-and-apply defendant, Live Nation. But there is also a

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motion for contempt for failure to comply with the preliminary injunction that was entered last January.

First, let me say that my initial reading of the motion with respect to the defendants dismissing for lack of jurisdiction is going to be denied. I believe there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the individual defendants have appeared in Massachusetts sufficient to convey jurisdiction on this district. Obviously, when we get to the motion to transfer venue, it is a discretionary decision. There is going to be inconvenience with respect to somebody, either the plaintiff appearing in Louisiana or the defendants appearing here in Massachusetts.

It seems to me that the plaintiffs have made a strong argument that their choice of forum should be respected. There is no reason that jumps out to this Court as to why I should transfer this case to Louisiana or that I don't have jurisdiction. So I am going to allow, in a moment, the defendants to have a few minutes to try to dissuade me from that ruling, that is, my strong inclination at this stage.

With respect to the contempt, it does seem to me that the defendants acted contemptuously to my injunction, at least until the responses that have come in after the filing of the motion, which tell me that for the last two-and-a-half months the defendants have been faithfully trying to get together the information that is necessary to comply with that injunction

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and have, in fact, put aside at least 20 percent of the receipts.

I don't recall any time saying in my injunction that the defendants were required only to put aside 20 percent of their receipts. But, nevertheless, that's what apparently they have done on the assumption, I suppose, that that's what you were required to do under the agreement with the plaintiff, the principal of which is this Mr. Stepanian, an artist management company.

But the entry of the preliminary injunction was not simply to get us back onto the track of what was required under that agreement. It was to have something available in case the plaintiff wins on the merits their claim that they're owed somewhere up around a half a million dollars. So I'm not sure on what grounds the defendants believe they are not in contempt of this court by simply putting 20 percent of the proceeds that they've received since January 1st in an account to be held by the defendants' lawyers in Louisiana, which was authorized. So I am waiting for an explanation as to why I should not hold the defendants in contempt in that regard.

The only other remaining outstanding motion that I'm aware of is the plaintiff's motion to impound or to seal, which is entirely without detail, and I have no idea what it is that the defendant -- rather, that the plaintiff wants me to impound. So I'm not inclined to allow that motion unless and

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until I am convinced that there is something that needs to be impounded or sealed. So I am inclined to deny that motion of the plaintiff's.

As I've said before, the fourth motion is now moot because Live Nation has been dismissed from this case.

I received just this morning apparently another motion for entry of a default against the Defendant Funky Meters, Inc., which I am not prepared to rule on. It obviously hasn't even been responded to by the defendants, and I am not -- apparently am not conversant with the relationship between the individual defendants and the corporate reach-and-apply defendant, Funky Meters, Inc. I surmise that there is some relationship because it sounds as though Mr. Porter has an ownership interest in that Funky Meters, Inc., but I don't know what the corporate relationship is and, therefore, am not prepared to go forward with resolving that issue.

But I'm going to hear briefly from either Mr. Pieksen or Mr. Penton now with respect to the defendants' motion to dismiss this cause of action for lack of jurisdiction and/or transfer of venue. Who's going to be speaking for the defendant? Mr. Pieksen?

MR. PIEKSEN: I will, sir, yes, Pieksen.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PIEKSEN: Judge, for efficiency sake, I'm assuming you want to hear strictly about transfer. Or should I try and

dissuade you on personal jurisdiction?

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THE COURT: I told you where I stand, and I'm not going to give you a whole lot of time. I'm going to give you ten minutes right now to --

MR. PIEKSEN: Okay. Let me hit the transfer first, then. Obviously, the standard is about three prongs. It's the convenience of the witness, trial efficiency, financial positions of the parties. The first thing that we would indicate is that -- and this may play into a number of aspects of our motion. But it is very clear that the defendants specifically rejected a forum selection clause.

We're aware that the opposition semantically re-categorizes that, but it was an arbitration clause in Boston. And that was negated and taken out of the contract. It think that goes a long way towards establishing the intent of the defendants, the foreseeability, whether they expected to be, you know, hauled or hailed into court in Massachusetts.

THE COURT: That has to do with jurisdiction rather than venue, doesn't it, Mr. Pieksen?

MR. PIEKSEN: I think it goes towards both, predominately jurisdiction, but I think there is some overlap to venue as well. It certainly indicates that this issue came up and was addressed in contract formation, which would tie into convenience of witnesses and perhaps some of the other issues on the transfer of the 1404, which is why I bring it up.

Moving on to the witnesses --

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THE COURT: But the agreement between the parties does talk about Massachusetts law applying, does it not?

MR. PIEKSEN: Yes, it does, sir. No question that

Massachusetts law applies, but I think it's a long way from

Massachusetts law applies to Massachusetts law will be applied

in Massachusetts, especially under federal diversity.

As far as the element of the convenience of the witnesses, I mean, we briefed it, you know. There's not a whole lot more to add to that except to amplify that while both sides have submitted documentation to your Honor of voluminous witnesses who may be called in this case, what's really relevant is the witnesses who can talk about contract formation, contract performance, and contract breach.

I believe from the plaintiffs you'll see an affidavit stating that there are about 80 witnesses, 20 of whom are identified in the pleadings, and all of whom appear to be vendors or other sort of ancillary players, shall we say, in this arrangement. They will not be able to testify as to contract formation. They will not be able to testify as to the defendants' activities, especially the defendants' activities in Massachusetts if -- you know, if that issue is still open in your mind.

So, you know, the witnesses who will be involved on a level would be all three individual defendants, their wives or

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partners who were available and present during some of the meetings in Louisiana. And just to give you, again, the real quick background, these defendants did not seek out Highsteppin'. Highsteppin' came to them. January 18, 2005, email from Highsteppin's principal to Mr. Porter soliciting -- essentially asking for a meeting to discuss merchandising.

And if you notice, when -- if you hadn't had a chance to look at that email in depth, it talks about an artist-controlled environment. That's key because while that was discussed, that's not what transpired here. What basically transpired -- it got flipped on its head.

The reason I bring that up is you see an email talking about artist-controlled environment setting up a situation for the arrangement that was not carried out. That artist-controlled environment was key to the defendants. And so, you know, those witnesses who can talk about all of that, they're all in Louisiana. You have the three individual defendants. You have their wives. You have perhaps one or two other individuals who were active with Mr. Eveline, who was the attorney down in Louisiana, who were actively involved at that stage.

Countered against that, you have the plaintiff with one principal and the plaintiff's in-house counsel. The rest of the witnesses on both sides, quite frankly, are minor. And I will say in this analysis, they really don't factor in. So

the convenience of the witnesses, I would argue --

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THE COURT: Let me change the subject just a minute.

Apparently, there's a fact contest as to where the contract was actually executed. You say it was executed in Louisiana. The plaintiffs say it was executed in Massachusetts. What evidence do you have in support of your claim?

MR. PIEKSEN: Sure. If I could, your Honor, I think, more specifically, the contract states that it was entered into in Massachusetts. I'm not sure whether the plaintiffs have actually factually averred that it was signed anywhere other than New Orleans.

THE COURT: That's a start. Why did your client sign if they didn't believe that it was actually entered into in Massachusetts when it says in black and white that it was?

MR. PIEKSEN: It's a good question. I'll tell you my clients are much better musicians than they are lawyers.

THE COURT: They didn't have legal counsel when they were executing this agreement?

MR. PIEKSEN: They had counsel, your Honor. They had counsel.

THE COURT: So I can't blame them for their lack of knowledge of the law.

MR. PIEKSEN: I wouldn't ask you to do that. I would ask you to take it into consideration, the relative sophistication legally of the parties.

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What I would indicate to you is that even if

Massachusetts law applies that still doesn't necessarily

mandate venue and jurisdiction in Massachusetts.

THE COURT: I understand that. But the phrase that we're dealing with now is -- in the contract it says the contract was "executed" in Massachusetts.

MR. PIEKSEN: I think -- with all due respect, I think it says "entered into."

THE COURT: All right, "entered into." Fair enough.

MR. PIEKSEN: That's in the contract. The language is there. The language is factually inaccurate, albeit in the contract. Mr. Stepanian, I guess, had first met Mr. Porter and, I believe, Mr. Stoltz in Florida. Then he came to New Orleans. They met at Mr. Porter's house. There was some discussion. And the contract, the agreement, was actually signed in New Orleans during Jazz Fest in 2006, so almost four years ago. I think that goes a long way towards showing Louisiana.

Getting back to, you know, performance in and breach, we have allegations of a breach of contract but no specific facts that I can discern on what exactly the breach was. All the gigs, all the engagements, were played. Proper notice, timely notice, was given of nonrenewal of the agreement. It was a two-year agreement with, you know, subsequent periods that could be agreed to.

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And it appears that really this lawsuit in large part is a genesis from the defendants' decision not to continue with the contract, which they had a legal right to do. So where is the breach? They played everything. They did what they were supposed to do. I'm sure --

THE COURT: Did they pay the commissions and return the advances that allegedly were made by the plaintiffs?

MR. PIEKSEN: That's an interesting question. If you notice, in the pleadings the plaintiff alleges that all the money went through their bank accounts. Defendants didn't get the money. They got some salary for a while and then that's it. They don't even have control over their own money.

You'll notice that there was an allegation that the defendants netted \$650,000. Well, what's the gross? We're waiting on an accounting. That's one of the things -- once we get past the preliminary venue and jurisdiction issues, we're eager to get to the merits. We're eager to see the accounting. We're eager to see what these expenses are. What money was spent? Where? When?

The contract calls for written approval of all expenses over \$2,000 a month. There is no such written approval, and yet there's an allegation that half-a-million-dollars-plus was spent over three-and-a-half years on a band that was making roughly \$100,000 a year. It doesn't add up. To answer you on the accounting, we're

waiting. We'd like to see it.

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To get back into the other aspects of the alleged breaches, there's no breach that the guys didn't do what they were supposed to do, didn't play the music they were supposed to play.

And then the performance of the contract, again, 95-plus percent of the defendants' obligations under this contract occurred outside Massachusetts. We sent you a list attached as an exhibit to our reply that had, as best as we can create, all the engagements, all the performances entered into by the defendants. And of those 200-some-odd performances, somewhere between four and eight were in Massachusetts. The rest were elsewhere.

THE COURT: The last I heard, though, when one establishes whether or not there's jurisdiction, I don't have to look at percentages of the time spent outside of the district and in the district. It's whether or not there were sufficient contacts. Nobody has told me that that's more or less than 5 percent of the activity of the corporation. So I don't -- that doesn't, you know, weigh on whether or not I have jurisdiction over your clients.

MR. PIEKSEN: Well, I would submit to you that it factors in when you look at the substantial nature of the contract -- of the contacts in the forum state, the foreseeability of coming into the forum state. It was not

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foreseen -- if this had been a contract to come up and play a gig -- is it Great Woods, Little Woods? Some venue. If it was a contract to come up and play House Of Blues, something like that, I wouldn't be making this argument to you because it's clear that the performance of that type of contract would be in Massachusetts.

But this contract was not contemplated as a Commonwealth-based contract. Plaintiff's own pleadings, you know, state that the defendants were virtually in a different city every day. They're working, traveling musicians. They play coast to coast. They don't play Europe and Japan. They never have as this group. We'll table that for now. But they've -- the point being is that it's minimal the actual in-Massachusetts efforts, you know, by the defendants. And I think that ties back into standing.

THE COURT: I need you to wrap up, Mr. Pieksen.

MR. PIEKSEN: Sure, sure. Let me go pretty quickly.

Trial efficiency, again, I mean, we understand that it's somewhat of a close call, but we would submit to the Court that the issuance of subpoenas for getting witnesses to trial, important witnesses, would militate towards Louisiana.

Certainly, the cost. You know, the defendants, like I say, are working musicians. You can tell from the escrow submissions that Mr. Batiste and Mr. Stoltz do not make much money whatsoever. Mr. Porter was making a living. He's having

a bit of a struggle now with some of the restrictions on his income that are currently in place. But, you know, I think when you balance the financial positions, that definitely weighs in favor of the defendants.

If I need to wrap up, that's basically it, Judge, unless you have any other questions.

THE COURT: Thank you. I'll hear from Mr. Baker in that regard.

MR. BAKER: Thank you, Judge. Unless the Court advises me otherwise, I'll just respond to his points. Your Honor, as far as contract formation goes, Attorney David Herlihy to my right is in-house counsel. He spent months negotiating the agreement. He had numerous telephone conversations and conferences and the exchange of emails with Attorney Eveline. A number of different generations of contract went back and forth.

Mr. Porter and his wife were in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in September, at the expense of my client, for approximately five days. They had daily meetings concerning negotiations with respect to the formation of the contract. During that same period, your Honor, Mr. Stepanian provided airfare and lodging for Brian Stoltz, one of the other defendants who also participated in the formation of the contract by way of negotiations.

In November of 2005, Mr. Porter was artist in

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residency for a week at Berklee School of Music. During that entire period of time, Mr. Stepanian had daily meetings with Mr. Porter here in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts about the formation of a management agreement. All of these terms ultimately formed the basis for an agreement.

The mention by my brother from New Orleans with respect to the arbitration clause, it was an arbitration clause. It wasn't agreed upon. It was taken out. Paragraph 21 of the agreement, your Honor, makes clear choice of law was Massachusetts. And because of the nature of where the defendants were going to be traveling and where the defendants were at the time that all of these discussions occurred, the parties agreed the formation of the agreement would be in Massachusetts. It's in Paragraph 21.

In addition to that, your Honor, the contract was to be deemed performed in Massachusetts for the same reason. I've submitted to your Honor an affidavit signed by my brother, Mr. Herlihy, which makes clear these terms were contemplated by the defendants. They didn't rebut them. They didn't dispute them. That was the basis for Paragraph 21.

I wish to draw the Court's attention to Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the agreement. Paragraph 2, your Honor, makes clear of the precise services that Highsteppin', as the management company, would provide. It goes through an extremely expansive litany of services that Highsteppin' was going to provide to

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the defendants. If you read Paragraph 2 in conjunction, your Honor, with Paragraph 3, which is styled, "Authority of Highsteppin'," I just wish to read to the Court the very first sentence. "Highsteppin' is hereby irrevocably appointed Artist's exclusive, true and lawful attorney-in-fact, for the full Term, which appointment is hereby deemed a right coupled with an enforceable interest therein, for Artist and in Artist's behalf, to do any of the following." It gives Paragraph 3 a Roman Numeral 10 explanation of all of the services that Highsteppin' was going to perform here in the Commonwealth for the benefit and with the express agency approval by the defendants.

I wish to draw the Court's attention to a case which the defendants cited called <u>Daynard</u>. It's a First Circuit Court of Appeals case, your Honor, which says, where an agent is part of the basis for jurisdiction, that can meet the requirements of due process. Interestingly enough, the defendants never disputed the Long-Arm Statute and whether the plaintiff's arguments comply. We certainly briefed it to your Honor.

The basis for our jurisdiction is simply not formation of the agreement, but it certainly includes that. It's the entire three-and-a-half-year performance by Highsteppin' with the express authorization and at the direction of the defendants. I'm not going to burden the Court with the myriad

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things they did, but on a daily basis -- and it's in the papers. It's in Mr. Stepanian's affidavit, Mr. Herlihy's affidavit and three other affidavits from independent contractors and employees. On a daily basis they checked with the venues. They received payments here in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. They paid for the hotel. They paid for the bus. They paid for the car. They paid for the flight. They had scores of emails back and forth every day from Mr. Batiste, Mr. Stoltz and Mr. Porter as to any logistical need whatsoever they had.

In addition, here in the Commonwealth, we were in charge of and we complied with replication of CDs. We'd take a master. We would multiproduce it and distribute it. We were in charge of their e-commerce. We developed web pages here in the Commonwealth, and we maintained them for each of the defendants. We increased their email lists from 300 to 10,000. If Mr. Porter's fan asked Mr. Porter for a signed photograph of Mr. Porter, he would instruct somebody from Highsteppin' -- they would put the stamp on the envelope and put the picture in the mail. The level of participation on behalf of Highsteppin', I submit to your Honor, with respect to the work that we did for the defendants, with their knowledge, with their express assent, consent, and for their benefit, is expansive.

Mr. Pieksen says I don't really understand what this

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dispute is about. Attached to our amended complaint and to our original complaint, your Honor, is our accounting which identifies \$527,000 person by person of the three putative defendants and how much each of them owes and for what purpose.

In addition to that, when I submitted to your Honor -or to this court, I should say, excuse me -- our motion for a
preliminary injunction, Mr. Stepanian signed an affidavit.

Again, there was that same accounting person by person, amount
and breakdown of the monies that were owed.

Mr. Pieksen raises an interesting point which I just wish to address to the Court because I don't think it's really part of today's hearing. But that is, where did the money go? The defendants constantly asked us and we provided to them, because we had an interest in a larger picture, a bigger business enterprise, loan advances and monies so that they could fund their lifestyles in whatever manner that they wanted, and seldom did Mr. Stepanian ever turn them down.

The monies that we were entitled to, they wanted to reinvest in the business and we agreed at the time. And that's why there is this substantial amount of money, which could very well have not been a bigger issue if the defendants had not chosen to pull out of this agreement. So that is, your Honor, why I suggest that --

THE COURT: You've talked about jurisdiction. Talk a couple of minutes about venue.

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MR. BAKER: Your Honor, with respect to the witnesses we have identified, these are -- the case law says it's not simply the number. It's the quality of witnesses. These are people -- if you look at Mr. Stepanian's affidavit, Mr. Herlihy, Miss Dyer and the other two persons, these witnesses all go to the very heart of contract performance, what we did here in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with respect to managing their business, paying their bills, answering their daily calls and everything.

I've only put in Mr. Stepanian's affidavit 32 identified witnesses because I didn't want to overwhelm the Court. I have a list of the other 50-some-odd witnesses. I think those 32 witnesses, who are all local, who are all capable of testifying about the core issue, which is, how is Mr. Stepanian's business -- how did it perform with respect to the contract that it entered into with the defendants? The defendants cited that it's easy. Did they pay? No, they didn't. That is our allegation. Did we perform? We did all of these services. We provided ongoing business foundation for their needs while they were traveling around the world. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Pieksen, do you want one minute of rebuttal?

MR. PIEKSEN: I'll take it, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. You can stay there if you'd like.

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MR. PIEKSEN: Thank you. Real briefly, first of all, it's not the plaintiff's activities in the forum state that matter. It's the defendant's. I mean, the case law is clear. So I'd like to make that. Nobody disputes that the plaintiff is based here and the plaintiff did what the plaintiff did in Massachusetts. It's what the defendants did or did not do in Massachusetts. So I'd like to make that point.

The accounting, we saw. It's really a nonissue for today, although we would indicate it's woefully inadequate. It doesn't really answer the questions.

As far as reinvesting in the business, whose business?

The money wasn't reinvested in PBS or the three individual defendants. I'd like to point that out.

As far as Mr. Porter and Mr. Stoltz being in Boston, the question really is, you know -- Number 1, that was before the contract, almost a year before the contract. Number 2, it was never presented that way. What was presented was Katrina hit. Everybody got wiped out. And, you know, quite frankly, Mr. Porter and his wife thought that they -- it was a friend who was helping them out in a time of need, not somebody who would come back as a wolf in sheep's clothing and say, I helped you out when you were down and now we have jurisdiction over you. It's irrelevant, quite frankly. It was before the contract. There were no week-long meetings for contract formation.

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Quite frankly, I would suggest if the Court needs to hear more on this, perhaps we could do a videoconference with some witnesses if the Court has further questions in the future to facilitate, or we'll come back up here if we need to. But I would just like to point that out, that any largesse that was given to Mr. Porter or Mr. Stoltz was not given under the guise of, hey, this is part of a contract and a business arrangement. It's more like, jeez, you guys had a real bad turn of events down there. We'll try and help you out. Any questions, your Honor?

THE COURT: No. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Pieksen. These arguments are, as usual, never all one side and not on the other. But I have sufficient evidence to decide this motion, and I am going to deny the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and I am going to deny the motion to transfer venue. So the case is going to stay in this session.

And I now have before me a motion for contempt, but I would ask you, Mr. Baker, to address that motion in light of the filings that have been made by the defendants since the filing of that motion. It does seem to me that a good-faith effort has been made on behalf of the defendants to explain to me the lack of immediate response; that is, it took apparently two-and-a-half months after my entry of the preliminary injunction, but, in fact, there has been a submission that tries to explain to me what money was received by the

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defendants and where it is and what amount has been put aside.

How does that change your motion to me to hold the defendants in contempt?

MR. BAKER: Your Honor, I just received this morning, just to be clear, a supplement by Mr. Penton, so I don't really know exactly what they've said. But I do have the benefit of a submission which Mr. Penton made approximately a week ago, so I'm working off of that one. I just want to be clear with the Court.

Your Honor's order said performance fees shall be paid into escrow. And perhaps your Honor may recall, but if not, let me refresh the Court's memory, please. Mr. Penton and I had a number of discussions in January about restraining monies at least until he could, to use his repeated statements, get his hawks in, which I construed to mean to file his appearances and get approved and all of that. Fine. He sent me a letter, and I presented it to the Court and the Court said fine. Let's file this.

The order that you entered states that the performance fees shall be escrowed. They shall be identified to me within ten days of the defendants knowing about them. For instance, the defendants are alerted that they're going to have a gig.

It's going to be a \$5,000 fee. Ten days later Mr. Penton says, Mr. Baker, your \$5,000 is coming in, of which Mr. Porter gets \$3,000. What I'm having a problem with, your Honor, is the

amount that we're owed is approximately \$550,000.

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The defendants have created their own accounting system. Your order says place the fees in escrow. We chose Mr. Penton because that's what he wanted. I presented the letter to your Honor and your Honor accepted. It doesn't say deduct what you consider to be reasonable expenses or necessary expenses or direct expenses and then, after that, take what's left and calculate 20 percent and put that in escrow or exempt in its entirety some of those fees, which is what they've done.

We have an idea of how much money is going to be paid through May 31st. I cite May 31st as a date, your Honor, because the New Orleans Jazz Fest is happening in about two weeks, I believe.

MR. PIEKSEN: Two days.

MR. BAKER: Two days, as my brother advises. And substantial revenues are going to be generated by the defendants. Your order is clear. The fees will be paid into escrow within ten days of identification. I don't really care that they were late. I spoke to Mr. Penton in February. He said I was going to have it in two days. I waited another month and a half and filed my motion.

What I care about, Judge, is that Mr. Stepanian's affidavit shows he believes it's somewhere in the neighborhood of \$200,000 will be grossed by these defendants through May 31st. They have filed an accounting with the Court that shows

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\$4,000 or \$5,000 paid, and we believe at least half of that money has been generated through to today. What I find myself subjected --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. They say how much is going to -- 400,000, did you say?

MR. BAKER: No, sir. What I said was, we believe through the filing of the complaint for contempt, which is, I think, April 12th, with the Court, Mr. Stepanian and I worked carefully on an affidavit for a number of days trying to figure it out. I asked Mr. Stepanian, who's still in the business and still in the music industry, what he believed these defendants would generate, and he's certainly qualified to do that because he represented them for four years. And he told me, from the date of the orders, your Honor's orders, through April 13th, I believe that they have grossed \$100,000 in performance fees, obviously plus or minus. And that's based on the Court's definition.

From April 13th to the end of May, because there's going to be a lot of activity, as Mr. Pieksen points out, in a couple of days, excuse me, we believe through the end of May, these defendants are going to gross another \$100,000. What I'm having a problem with, and I think that the defendants — although they made a "good-faith attempt" to comply with the Court's order, what I'm having difficulty with is the Court order said put the performance fees in escrow, not 20 percent

of the net fees after you take expenses. And at the rate that we're going, unless Mr. Penton can come up with some other idea, the monies will be secured in some way, shape or form in the year 2025. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Before you sit down, Mr. Baker, and notwithstanding the fact that the injunction says what you say it says, that is, to put all of the funds received into escrow, what was the intent -- what was the understanding of the parties back in January as to how the defendants were going to live in the meantime? If they were going to put 100 percent of their receipts into escrow, how were they going to survive?

MR. BAKER: It's a valid question, absolutely. I don't know the answer to that because Mr. Penton and I had a couple of phone conversations, and I said, This is what I'm looking for. Keep in mind, your Honor, for three-and-a-half years we paid all their living expenses and everything. The monies from the performance came in, and we didn't get to collect any of that. I think if you look over the aggregate period it's not unreasonable for us to say that.

Now, to answer your Honor's question, I don't know the answer to that in all fairness to the Court and certainly to the defendants. But that's not what the court order says. At the rate we're going, it's just never going to amount to anything significant.

THE COURT: What about the provision that 30 percent

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of the fees received in connection with publishing rights --

MR. BAKER: That was specifically requested by Mr.

Penton, not the 30 percent. If your Honor goes back and looks at the January 19, 2010, letter, which your Honor ordered that I file with the Court -- I submitted it with the injunction proposed order that I gave to your Honor -- Mr. Penton said, I don't want you to take all of the publishing rights, if that's what it says, the 30 percent. I said fine and I submitted the letter to your Honor. And I put in the proposed order which your Honor then considered and signed. Thirty percent will go to the defendants because I was --

THE COURT: And that will amount to what?

MR. BAKER: I don't know, your Honor. It was my understanding that that would be a significant amount. I can't tell you what the dollar amount is because none of these reach-and-apply defendants seem to want to account.

THE COURT: How does it compare with the projected receipts that your client believes he's going to receive?

(Discussion held off the record.)

MR. BAKER: I am informed by my co-counsel that it varies based on the record sales and things of that nature, and I don't know the answer to that. In my conversations with Penton at the time I was -- I believed that that would be a sufficient amount, 30 percent of the publishing rights, certainly for Mr. Porter who's got, as Mr. Penton's papers

indicate, 40 years of history in the music business and a substantial worldwide reputation in that regard.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Penton.

MR. PENTON: Yes, your Honor, may it please the Court.

Ronnie Penton. Let me say that I know this Court doesn't know

me. I have practiced law in these federal courts in the United

States for 30 years. I was a professional musician for 20

years. So I bring to my analysis of the Court's order the

industry experience as well as the legal experience.

And I'm here personally to tell you that in my 30 years I've never been held in contempt by a court in any state. I've never had a client held in contempt. And if the Court in its good reasoning feels that this was contemptuous, I would ask that I be allowed to fall on the sword here and take that responsibility because it was my experience that looked at this order.

And I need to explain to the Court why we did the accounting we did. From the time on December 30th that the temporary restraining order was first filed by Highsteppin', the term "fees" were used. And it was perpetuated through an amended temporary restraining order. It was perpetuated in a request for a preliminary injunction, and it was perpetuated in the order for preliminary injunction where the TRO was converted.

Judge, I wrote a letter because we were just retained.

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We couldn't get here. And the Court was very gracious in allowing us -- in fact, Jeffrey even submitted my letter, which I did appreciate he did that.

Judge, the problem we have here, the Court sees it.

The fact is, is that these artists have really two types of income that they receive. These particular artists may produce a venue themselves where they put together three or four or four or five side men or musicians to come with them to play a show. As a part of that show, they have travel expenses. They may have equipment rental expenses. They even may have booking agency expenses that they have to pay.

So at the end of that show -- let's just say that they're given an offer of \$2,500 for a two-hour show. Well, they have to pay all these folks. There is no way that -- if you define "fees" as has been perpetuated in these orders, there is no way they could turn over \$2,500 in a self-produced show because they have all these expenses to pay.

Now, the other type of income they receive, if they are a side man -- if the Court would take a look at the spreadsheets, you'll see that in many instances they are side men. In other words, they're paid for the show. They're paid by someone else a flat fee, \$100, \$250, and maybe even sometimes more.

The fact is, Judge, if these musicians were required to pay and define fees as 100 percent of gross receipts, they

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wouldn't work. They couldn't work because they couldn't go do that show and pay 100 percent of that.

Now, Judge, when we were trying to determine the identification of fees, we went to great pains. And the Court would see in the spreadsheets, we disclosed it all; in other words, all the expenses, all of the percentages due to someone else, in a spreadsheet form, for this kind of forum here that we're in, that we can work these things out. We were not intentionally trying to be contemptuous. We have all the information on every one of those shows there.

We're prepared to sit down, even in an amended preliminary injunction order, in order to hammer out what "fees" mean. Does it mean gross receipts? Does it mean net receipts? What does it mean? And get together a reporting period as well as a disclosure of all expenses or all percentages or whatever.

We looked at the 30 percent of the publishing. I made a comment in the January 19th letter, at least on the publishing that preexisted the relationship with Highsteppin', you know, please don't take everything they have. Now, Judge, what's interesting, none of these publishers will pay a penny. Every one of the defendants' publishers have said, No, guys. Our policy is we're withholding all publishing royalty until such --

THE COURT: Withholding all? I didn't hear it.

You're withholding all?

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MR. PENTON: Yes, sir. The publishing companies are withholding 100 percent of all publishing royalty until these issues -- legal issues are resolved. Now, there were publishing companies that were served with these injunctions, and so it matters not that there's 30 percent that was written into here. They're receiving zero percent of publishing royalties.

But, Judge, I would just say that this is our first time before you. If you feel that my analysis of fees and really looking at the total reality of it -- what we did when we looked at the 30 percent, we tried to capture the 20 percent that was due to Highsteppin'. We tried to itemize all the gross expenses in a show so that if the Court required us to make a higher deposit, we're prepared to do that, Judge.

I just would say one thing about it. What we learned in the ten-day rule that was written into it, it was hard to get the first things together because we were in a reconstruction mode. Your order said "not yet payable" if you'll remember reading that. We went back -- that would have been January 26th. We went back to the show here in Boston at the House Of Blues that they played for the -- the Meters played for the National Hockey League.

And we picked that up, too, in a good-faith effort to bring that money forward because Mr. Baker had tried to serve

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subpoenas, I believe, on certain parties in order to sequester that money where the Meters played. That was just Mr. Porter and Mr. Batiste. Mr. Stoltz didn't play that Meters job here in Boston for New Year's Eve.

But, Judge, we made the decision to go back to when the original suit was filed and recapture those dollars, and we did that in order to be in good faith with this Court. So that's my plea to your Honor. I would ask that -- even to counsel I asked, Give me a break. I did the best I could to make a good-faith showing. We are prepared to modify our reporting in any manner.

THE COURT: All right. I think I've heard sufficient, Mr. Penton, and I do appreciate your explanation. It was not the intent of the Court, nor do I believe it was the intent of the plaintiff, to ask for the escrowing of funds before the netting out of expenses that are necessary to gain the gross in the first place. In other words, if your clients, when they make a performance, get a net -- or a gross of -- pick a number out of the air -- 50,000, and it costs them \$30,000 to get that \$50,000, nobody, at least realistically, can ask them to submit the 50 and not pay their vendors the 30 to make the 50.

But having said that, it is certainly, and was, the intent of this Court to require the escrowing of more than what was due just going forward as though the contract had not been breached because I am dealing with an allegation that I found

to be, at the stage of the preliminary injunction, a likely winning one. That's the standard under which the plaintiff had to prove to get me to enter a preliminary injunction, a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim. They claim that your clients owe them roughly \$500,000. So they are entitled to have escrowed more than just what would have been going forward with the contract in the first place, which is, as I understand it, the 20 percent.

MR. PENTON: Yes, sir.

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THE COURT: So somewhere between 20 and 100 percent is an appropriate amount to have been escrowed from the gross receipts of your client, more than 20 if -- albeit, less than 100. That's a number that I have no knowledge of being able to determine, but you folks very well should. And I'm going to require you to sit here, because I don't have anything more in this courtroom at least until in the middle of the afternoon, and negotiate this out as to something that is going to be satisfactory to both sides going forward, understanding that what we're trying to do here is to provide the plaintiffs with some security if and when they are able to prove their case in court.

They haven't proved it yet. They've only argued for a preliminary injunction. I was convinced that they were entitled to a preliminary injunction, and I remain convinced that they are. But it's up to you folks to determine exactly

what that means and the accounting that is necessary that can put Mr. Baker and his folks on his side in some sort of comfort zone as to knowing that they have got a fund available from which to argue at the end of the day. That's what we're going to do here.

Any problem with that, Mr. Baker?

MR. BAKER: None whatsoever, your Honor. That sounds reasonable.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't you then remain -you can sit here. We do have a little anteroom out there if
you'd prefer to be outside of the courtroom. But you can use
this courtroom if you'd like to try to turn the tables around,
face each other and see if you can't resolve this issue as
we're going to go forward because now we are going to go
forward in this case.

The next thing is we're going to have a scheduling conference here sooner rather than later because this case has now got some teeth on it. It's what?, three or four months old. We should get to the point of having a scheduling order, and that -- my deputy will submit to you, if not today, a form that will inform you how to respond. And, basically, it's getting together and deciding what you think is a fair scheduling order, and then I'll determine whether I think it's fair.

If necessary, we'll have another conference. I don't

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1 mean to drag people back from Louisiana for such a thing. 2 certainly in other cases allowed counsel to appear by telephone for scheduling conferences, so that can be done. This is 3 4 something that counsel ought to sit here today and resolve how 5 we're going to get from A to B. 6 And I am disinclined at this stage to enter an order 7 of contempt. I don't think that you acted deliberately contemptuously, Mr. Penton. I believe that you have been 8 acting in good faith, and I expect that as an officer of this 9 12:07 10 court, as you are, as is plaintiff's counsel, you will proceed 11 to resolve this issue. 12 Anything else then that needs to come to my attention at this stage? 13 14 MR. BAKER: Not from the plaintiff's side, your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Mr. Penton? 16 MR. PENTON: None, your Honor. THE COURT: And Mr. Pieksen? 17 18 MR. PIEKSEN: No, sir. 19 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel. Good 12:08 20 luck. 21 (Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m. the hearing concluded.) 22 23 24 25